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Why Climate Law Must Be Federal:
The Clash between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
and State Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems
JOSEPH ALLAN MACDOUGALD
Absent Federal legislation or leadership on regulatory responses to
greenhouse gas ("GHG ")-based climate problems, the states have sought,
either on their own or through regional agreements, to restrict the amount
of GHG released by the electric power plants within their states. These
systems are subject to "leakage," the ability ofpower providers to receive
electricity from an "extra-regional" and hence unregulated source. While
practical considerations may limit the immediate impact of leakage, in the
long term, state-based systems perversely provide competitive advantages
to unrestricted GHG-emitting power sources that do not have the burden
of compliance. One logical avenue to address leakage would be to directly
or indirectly ban or penalize the purchase of power from other sources.
Prohibiting these solutions is the combination of the Supreme Court's
dormant commerce clause analyses that prevents states from
discriminating against identical goods based on origin. Most relevant and
troubling is the West-Lynn Creamery case, which shows the Court's
willingness to find unconstitutional purpose among several disparate
statutory schemes if, in combination, their effect is to penalize an out-of-
state supplier of identical goods. This Article reviews this line of
reasoning and posits that this limitation is the ultimate rationale for a
Federal response to GHG-based climate legislation.
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Why Climate Law Must Be Federal:
The Clash between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
and State Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems
JOSEPH ALLAN MACDOUGALD*
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. -1
-[Even if environmental preservation were the central purpose of [a
state's] pricing [law], that would not be sufficient to uphold a
discriminatory regulation. "2
I. INTRODUCTION
Nature abhors a vacuum both in physical and social realms. Despite
the Supreme Court's April 2007 holding in Massachussetts v. E.P.A. that
Greenhouse Gases ("GHGs") emitted by automobiles are pollutants within
the meaning of the Clean Air Act, the federal government has made no
progress toward developing a national climate law.3  While the United
States federal government has withdrawn from the international
Greenhouse Gas ("GHG") debate, state governments have been rapidly
filling the void.4 Driven by an otherwise unaddressed public concern, the
* Lecturer in Law, Member of the Adjunct Faculty, University of Connecticut School of Law.
Masters in Environmental Management, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (2005); J.D.
University of Connecticut School of Law (1996); M.B.A. New York University Stern School of
Business (1991); A.B. Brown University (1987).
1 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1994).
3 "Because greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act's capacious definition of 'air
pollutant,' we hold that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate the emission of such gases from
new motor vehicles." Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007) [hereinafter
Massachusetts v. EPA.]. Further evidencing a lack of quick federal action is the Massachusetts v.
E.P.A. plaintiff-state's seeking of a Writ of Mandamus to compel the EPA's compliance with the
Court's ruling. For the April, 2008 writ, see Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Compliance
with Mandate, Massachusetts v. EPA., 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 03-1361), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Mass-v-EPA-Petition.pdf.
4 State-based activity has taken an international tenor. In October 2007, ten U.S. states joined
with nine European Unions countries, the European Commission, two Canadian provinces, and others
to form the International Carbon Action Partnership--a group that serves as a forum for those
regulating CO2 and other Greenhouse Gas emissions in fact or intent to share regulatory ideas and
encourage regional trading systems. Press Release, Int'l Carbon Action P'ship, Nations, States,
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last few years have seen a flurry of state government activity. Individual
states, such as California, Connecticut, and others have adopted state-based
GHG regulatory programs to limit their own state's emissions. 5 But of
interest to this Article are the constitutional implications involved when, as
is now the case, the majority of the states create state-based, multi-state, or,
6in some cases, international trading regions for GHG emissions.
The environmental movement has produced many successes from
ozone protection to cleaner water, but perhaps none of these was as
exciting as the market trading solution employed to address acid rain.7
Realizing that power plants emitted the largest amounts of acid rain
precursors, the federal government created caps and tradable permits to
provide market-based incentives to reduce harmful emissions.
Seeking to build upon the market success of the past, several states,
notably the Northeastern states, the Northwestern states (plus California),
and certain Midwestern states have separately formed groups to explore
creating state-based GHG trading regimes that concentrate on CO2
emissions. Specifically, the New England states, New York, Pennsylvania,
and others have bound themselves together through the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI") to form a GHG trading region-
perhaps the most developed of all regional programs. 8 Not to be left
behind, in July of 2007, California, Arizona, and other states, along with
some Canadian provinces, formed the Western Climate Initiative, a group
with very similar goals.9 Covering yet more of the country, Illinois, Iowa,
and other Midwestern states have created the Midwestern Accord, also in
conjunction with Canadian provinces, to explore a GHG trading region.l°
All in all, some thirty-two states are either full members or official
observers in a regional trading association.
These programs intend to use market-based initiatives and issue
permits for the current level GHG emissions. Like acid rain, these permits
would be tradable. But unlike the acid rain trading system for SO 2
Provinces Announce Carbon Markets Partnership to Reduce Global Warming (Oct. 29, 2007),
available at http://www.icap-carbonaction.com/index.htm.
5 See generally Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Most Recent Press Releases,
http://www.pewclimate.org/press room/sub_press room (last visited May 25, 2008) (providing
additional information on all news stories).
6 This Article considers the dormant Commerce Clause impact. For an insightful note on the
Compact Clause considerations, please see generally Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1958 (2007).
ANDREW AULISI ET AL., VIRI WHITE PAPER: GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN U.S.:
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS FROM THE OTC NO BUDGET PROGRAM (2005), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/noxghg.pdf.
9 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Goals and Guiding Principles,
http://www.rggi.org/goals.htm (last visited May 25, 2008) [hereinafter RGGI Goals].
9 The Western Climate Initiative (WCI), http://www.westemclimateinitiative.org (last visited May
25, 2008).
10 Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, New Direction, New Energy, New Jobs, and a
New World, http://www.midwestemaccord.org (last visited May 25, 2008).
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emissions, these systems do not have national coverage. This regional
construction presents fatal problems. What if a power distributor receives
its supply not from an in-region entity which has reduced its CO 2
emissions or purchased emission certificates, but from an out-of-region,
uncapped power generator? Since atmospheric CO 2, a dominant GHG,
affects the whole globe, the environmental damage is identical as if that
energy originated in the controlled region. This power importation from a
non-capped area is frequently referred to as "leakage."
This Article examines the constitutional limitations on state-based CO2
trading programs when they attempt to arrest leakage through a variety of
means. The Article concludes by discussing the wisdom of pursuing a
state-based cap-and-trade agenda since the Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis highlights the need for the development of Federal Climate Law.
II. THE PROBLEM AND POLICY OBJECTIVES OF CO 2 REGULATION
The 2001 Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change ("IPCC") Third
Report states that CO2 concentrations have grown thirty-one percent since
1750.11 CO2 is one of several greenhouse gases that have been identified
with global warming. In 2007, the Fourth Report of the IPCC notes that:
Eleven of the last twelve years (1995-2006) rank among the
twelve warmest years in the instrumental record of global
surface temperature (since 1850). The 100-year linear trend
(1906-2005) of 0.74 [0.56 to 0.92]°C is larger than the
corresponding trend of 0.6 [0.4 to 0.8]°C (1901-2000) given
in the [Third Assessment Report]. 12
The 2007 IPCC reports CO2 emissions affect the planet without respect
to boundaries. Emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases (i.e., CO 2, N20,
PFCs, SF 6) have a lasting effect on atmospheric composition, radiative
forcing, and climate.13
Because of the long cycle effect of these gases, a unit of CO 2 emitted
in Boston is equally destructive to Massachusetts (and the world) as a unit
of CO 2 emitted either in Montana or Auckland. Emit anywhere and have
the GHG problem everywhere.
This non-regional effect is significant when gauging the success of any
cap-and-trade program. On a policy basis, any program, to be successful,
must reduce net emissions. If a program were to simply shift emissions
from one region to another, then it is not accomplishing any serious
" ROBERT T. WATSON ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 8 (2001), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreporLs/tar/vol4/english/pdf/spm.pdf.
12 LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
'3 Id. at 36-39.
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environmental objective. 4 Conceivably, a program that merely relocates
emissions might actually harm the environment by hiding the problem
from a motivated electorate or by retarding more effective policy
development.
III. CO 2 CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEMS
Generally, a GHG or CO2 cap-and-trade program first establishes the
amount of gas currently released by a significant in-region emitter,
typically a power plant. Permits then issue up to this amount or some
other, similar formulaic limit. Many of the current regional proposals are
in working groups and drafts, so it is impossible to list the definitive
mechanics. However, the initial documents imply a strong likelihood that
these would mirror the acid rain permitting system, but would critically be
modified to work on a regional basis.' 5
Market mechanisms successfully countered acid rain by providing
market-based incentives to limit emissions. Emitters violating their "cap"
pay a per-unit penalty. Emitters investing in technology and reducing their
emissions found positive economic rewards by selling their excess permits
through a trading mechanism. 16
However, for any cap-and-trade system to be workable, the system
must define a market. From antitrust/market economics, a market for
permits, by definition, would contain no real non-system substitutes. 17 If
the permits have substantial substitutes, there will be market failure. The
value of the permits would be diluted by the substitutes' prices. But, what
would substitute for CO 2 permits? Counterfeit permits are unlikely. A
more likely culprit is power generated from an uncapped (or incompatibly
capped) source and sold into the region. Should a power generator require
14 Ironically, this point was well recognized by the Environmental Protection Agency in its oral
argument before the Court. The EPA argued that petitioners lacked standing because even if the United
States reduced emissions, the rest of the world might increase theirs.
Mr. Garre: And that's fine, Justice Souter, I grant you that. But they still have to
show that there is reason that it is likely to believe, that the reduction in that tiny
fraction of United States emissions, putting aside the [ninety-nine] percent or the
[ninety-five] percent in the rest of the world and what they do, and the evidence that
shows that greenhouse gas emissions in those countries are increasing, they have to
show the regulation of that tiny fraction would have an affect on their alleged
injuries, not to completely redress them, Your Honor.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006 05_1120/argument/.
15 THE NORTHEAST REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS COAL., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 6-10 (2005), available at http'//www.rggi.org/docs/neghg_
recommend.pdf [hereinafter RGGI: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS]; see also RGGI Goals, supra note 8.
16 This system was created by the federal government under their power to regulate commerce,
and thus is free of federal pre-emption or the dormant Commerce Clause challenges.
17 See Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger
Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 20-22 (1995) (describing market substitutes on a defined market); see
also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482 n.30 (1992) (discussing
market power).
[Vol. 40:1431
WHY CLIMATE LAW MUST BE FEDERAL
additional emissions under the program, they would have the option of. (1)
becoming more efficient, perhaps through technological investment, to
emit more power with less CO2; (2) purchasing additional permits in the
marketplace; (3) generating excess CO2 at some pre-defined penalty price;
or (4) arranging for the purchase of power from another supplier.
Purchasing permits is a good result as is functions within the system and
presumably those permits were liberated by some other company investing
in C0 2-efficient technologies. However, when a power distributor chooses
instead to purchase power through the grid which is supplied by an
uncapped energy source, the entry of this uncapped power is referred to as
"leakage."
IV. LEAKAGE DEFINED AND STATE-PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Leakage is the purchase of energy that originates from an uncapped,
extra-regional source.'8 It is also a serious issue for any cap-and-trade
program. RGGI has formed an Ad Hoc Leakage working group and
stakeholders have listed "account[ing] for and mitigat[ing] the likely
increase in GHG and air emissions from electricity imports into the RGGI
region as a result of regional CO2 regulation (i.e. leakage)" as one of
RGGI's key goals. 19
Leakage is of limited practical problems in the short term. The "grid"
can only deliver power up to its capacity. The current grid infrastructure is
both expensive to upgrade and under intense scrutiny as to its capacity.
Nevertheless, these limitations can change over time with the proper
20
economic incentive.
Leakage risks undermine the goal of the RGGI program in
two ways. First, any CO 2 emission reductions achieved in
the RGGI region will be offset, as power is imported from
surrounding areas that are not subject to CO2 emission limits.
Second, electricity imports will create a competitive
disadvantage for companies in the RGGI region.2'
If it is more cost effective to buy power from uncapped regions than to
"The issue of 'leakage' applies to both environmental and economic concerns. The term
generally refers to the migration of emissions from a regulated to an unregulated geographic area
(emissions leakage), but it also may refer to the related migration of economic activity (economic
leakage)." AULISI ET AL., supra note 7, at 13.
19 THE NORTHEAST REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS COAL., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES (2004) available at http://www.ghgcoalition.comldocuments/
ghgcoalitiongoalsobjectives.pdf.
20 Anthony DePalma, U.S. Proposal Could Lead to Corridor for Electricity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2007, at B5, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. The United States Department of Energy
"declared a multistate area from West Virginia to upstate New York a 'National Interest Electric
Transmission Corridor,' where congestion of existing power lines makes the electricity grid unreliable
and subject to blackouts." Id.
21 RGGI: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 9.
20081
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buy new permits or pay penalties, this creates increased demand for
uncapped power. As the uncapped power suppliers gain volume, they
become more efficient, increasing their price advantage. Also, capped
regions will likely have higher prices as they internalize the trading
program's costs, making them very attractive customers. There is a strong
incentive for the uncapped power companies to deliver power to supply
these regions through a power grid. These areas are also some of the most
densely populated in the country, making them both the largest and most
profitable. Over time, more and more excess power demand could be
serviced by the uncapped regions generating even more CO 2 with reduced
cost.
The states are keenly aware of this problem. The Northeast Regional
Greenhouse Gas Coalition has gone so far as to repeatedly advise that
"because leakage is a significant issue, the RGGI initiative should not be
fully implemented until this issue is addressed either by further modeling
or adoption of another mitigation method.
22
The question of emissions leakage in other states has been a
key issue dogging the Northeast regional greenhouse gas
initiative (RGGI), because power plants could simply
increase electricity production outside the state to offset
limits on power generation prompted by the regional cap on
emissions. . . . At a meeting the workgroup held [in May
2006] at the Vermont Law School, officials involved with
RGGI noted that even a small increase in emissions outside
the region could "swamp the program's benefits[.] 23
The RGGI and others are actively working on their solutions to
24 25leakage.24 Some documents suggest a declining cap, while others imply a
portfolio standard with a flexible cap.26  Others still hint at a ban on
27
uncapped emissions. Broadly, however, these solutions all involve
penalizing leakage either through a direct economic charge or by using the
purchases as going against the permits. In either event, the purchase of
2 2 Id. at 37.
23 Inside Washington Publishers, Northeast Plans to Extend Climate Cap Raises Constitutional
Questions, NICHOLS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, July 19, 2006,
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/news-neclimate.html.
24 See REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI), POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND THE
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI) (2008), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/20080331leakage.pdf [hereinafter RGGI, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE]
(providing an example of a report looking to solve the leakage problem).
25 See RGGI: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 2.
26 RGGI and the Concern about "Leakage," ENVTL. ENERGY INSIGHTS, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 6 (on
file with Connecticut Law Review).
27 See Don Thompson, California Eyes Cap-and-Trade Plan to Trim Greenhouse Gases, FREE
REPUBLIC, Apr. 6, 2005, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1378853/posts?page=l ("Western
generators could simply send their cleaner power to California and dirtier electricity to states without a
cap with no overall drop in emissions.").
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out-of-state power becomes artificially more expensive.
V. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Our Constitution preserves for Congress the right to regulate
commerce among the states. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
provides, among other things, that "Congress shall have power ...To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes. ' '28 "Into that affirmative grant the Court has
read judicially enforceable limits on state legislation when Congress has
not acted., 29 In general, if the states interfere with interstate commerce,
there is a two part analysis. The first question: (1) Is this an impermissible
avenue for state regulation or has the federal government pre-empted this
area by issuing its own regulations? If so, then the regulation is struck
down without reaching the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. If not,
then, (2) See if the law is discriminatory. If it is, "'either on its face or in
practical effect,' the burden falls on the State to demonstrate both that the
statute 'serves a legitimate local purpose,' and that this purpose could not
be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means. ' ' 0 The second
question activates the dormant Commerce Clause. Once the Court finds
discrimination, very few reasons constitute a legitimate local purpose.
Hotly litigated over the last hundred years, the Supreme Court has
invoked the dormant Commerce Clause in cases regulating baitfish,31
milk,32 solid waste,33 and many others. With rare exception, the Court will
invalidate any law that has the effect of one state penalizing another state's
goods. "A state tariff on imported goods violates the Commerce Clause
'by handicapping out-of-state competitors, thus artificially encouraging in-
state production even when the same goods could be produces [sic] at
lower cost in other States.'
34
The best way to illustrate the interaction between the dormant
Commerce Clause and climate regulation is through the analysis of three
cases: City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey ("Philadelphia"),35 the seminal
case in this area; Maine v. Taylor ("Maine"),36 a rare case of a state's
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. Further, another minority school of thought has looked for the
extremities of the dormant Commerce Clause in Article IV, Section 2, which guarantees that the
"Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.29 KATHLEEN M. SULLWAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 (15th ed. 2004).
30 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
3' Id. at 132, 137-38.
32 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 188 (1994).
33 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618, 628-29 (1978).
31 Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States' Rights: Discerning the
Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 584
(2004).
31 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
36 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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environmentally protective regulation surviving the Court's scrutiny; and
the all-important West Lynn Creamery v. Healy ("West Lynn"),37 which
shows that the Court is more interested in the ultimate economic effect
than the structure of the regulation.
A. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey
This case is perhaps the most significant Commerce Clause case for
purposes of analyzing a state's ability to restrict imports for environmental
reasons. New Jersey banned liquid and sold waste imports, reasoning that
its available landfill was being exhausted through imports and that "the
environment continues to be threatened by the treatment and disposal of
waste which originated or was collected outside the
State.38
The Court was not interested in New Jersey's environmental
intentions. 39  The Court held that "whatever New Jersey's ultimate
purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of
commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently. ''4
In Philadelphia, the Court seemed to imply that an article of commerce
can only be regulated by a state based on some characteristic inherent in
the article moving through commerce. The item's importation or sale must
pose some threat to a state interest, not simply its origin. The sold good's
origin alone cannot trigger the power of the state. The Court distinguished
New Jersey's rule from a quarantine since the imported goods did not
differ from New Jersey's own waste. 41 Even though New Jersey's natural
resources (its capacity to dispose of waste) were being exhausted and the
practice subjected its residents to harm, the court struck down the
regulation because of its ultimate effect on commerce.
B. Maine v. Taylor
This case is the exception that proves the Philadelphia rule. As one of
the very few recent cases where the Supreme Court upheld a state's import
restriction, the case shows that indistinguishable goods cannot be
37 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
38 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 625.
'9 See id at 626 ("This dispute about ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved, because
its resolution would not be relevant to the constitutional issue to be decided in this case."). The Court,
as we will see in the West Lynn analysis, discounts intent and focuses on the effect of the regulation.
Id. at 626-27.
40 Id. (emphasis added).
41 See id at 628-29 ("It is true that certain quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden
protectionist measures, even though they were directed against out-of-state commerce. But those
quarantine laws banned the importation of articles such as diseased livestock that required destruction
as soon as possible because their very movement risked contagion and other evils. Those laws thus did
not discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles,
whatever their origin.") (citations omitted).
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discriminated against. Like Philadelphia, the case was an absolute ban on
imports affecting natural resources, in this case, baitfish. The case
disclosed that certain baitfish carry harmful bacteria.42 In contrast, the
Philadelphia Court noted that:
There has been no claim here that the very movement of
waste into or through New Jersey endangers health, or that
waste must be disposed of as soon and as close to its point of
generation as possible .... [T]here is no basis to distinguish
out-of-state waste from domestic waste. If one is inherently
harmful, so is the other.43
Once it was established that the article of commerce was itself
harmful, the only real inquiry for the court was the reasonableness of the
state's restriction. While it was technologically feasible for Maine to
establish a quality-control program, which checked for bacteria on import,
the Court would not compel them to establish one. 44 Even this holding
underscored that Maine was addressing an in-state harm that was caused
by the importation itself. The entire Maine decision makes clear that when
the Court announced that you could not distinguish based on "origin" in
their ultimate Philadelphia holding, it truly meant that the states can only
regulate based on some characteristic inherent in the goods themselves.
C. West Lynn Creamery
As environmental laws become more complex and involve systems of
interlocking policies, the West Lynn analysis seems prophetic and of ever-
increasing relevancy. In West Lynn, the Court concerned itself with a
combination of Massachusetts laws. The first law required payments by all
retail milk dealers to make a deposit into a fund, tied directly to their
quantity of milk sold, irrespective of origin.45 In concert with these
payments was a second law that distributed these collected funds to
Massachusetts's dairy farmers.46
While a state has long been able to encourage local industry through
subsidy without running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause, it cannot
create the same economic advantage by instead taxing those who import.
42 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140-41 (1986) ("The prosecution experts testified that live
baitfish imported into the State posed two significant threats to Maine's unique and fragile fisheries.
First, Maine's population of wild fish-including its own indigenous golden shiners-would be placed
at risk by three types of parasites prevalent in out-of-state baitfish, but not common to wild fish in
Maine. Second, nonnative species inadvertently included in shipments of live baitfish could disturb
Maine's aquatic ecology to an unpredictable extent by competing with native fish for food or habitat,
by preying on native species, or by disrupting the environment in more subtle ways.") (citation
omitted).
41 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
"Maine, 477 U.S. at 147.
41 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1994).
4Id.
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The charge violates the dormant Commerce Clause, while the subsidy does
not.47 Similarly, a neutral tax on milk production almost certainly passes
constitutional muster. The Court was faced with a conundrum. When
several regulations are each, individually, constitutionally permissible, can
they all be struck down because of their combined effect? The Court's
answer was an unequivocal "yes," holding that it was
the entire program-not just the contributions to the fund or
the distributions from that fund-that simultaneously burdens
interstate commerce and discriminates in favor of local
producers. The choice of constitutional [elements of a
program]-nondiscriminatory tax and local subsidy--cannot
guarantee the constitutionality of the program as a whole.48
A carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program contains several elements,
such as the issuance of the permits, their trading system, as well as
additional penalties to prevent leakage. The conclusion under West Lynn
will be that the Court will look at all of these pieces together. However,
there is a second, and perhaps more troubling, element of West Lynn.
Dicta within footnote twenty of the holding gives a clear signal that
even the best state environmental motivations will not overcome a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge. 49 The statement comes from a portion of the
opinion where the Court is considering Massachusetts's attempt at a
balancing argument-in essence that any damage to interstate commerce is
outweighed by local benefits.50 The state's primary argument to the Court
was economic, but it included some, perhaps, less-than-thoughtful
environmental aspects.5' When advancing a weak environmental
47 The reasoning behind this is somewhat opaque. There seems to be a vague sense in the cases
that a subsidy is a state allocating its own money without actually hurting another individual industry.
The response to this is potentially for other states to spend their own money to subsidize. The Court
may rationally feel that the in-state political process is a reasonable brake on this process.
By conjoining a tax and a subsidy, Massachusetts has created a program more
dangerous to interstate commerce than either part alone. Nondiscriminatory
measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, are generally upheld, in spite of any
adverse effects on interstate commerce, in part because "[tjhe existence of major in-
state interests adversely affected ... is a powerful safeguard against legislative
abuse."
Id. at 199-200.4 1 Id. at 201.49 Id. at 204 n.20.
50 Massachusetts was attempting to move the Court beyond a strict scrutiny standard into a
balancing of harms. "Finally, respondent argues that any incidental burden on interstate commerce is
outweighed by the local benefits of preserving the Massachusetts dairy industry." West Lynn
Creamery, 512 U.S. at 204 (internal quotations omitted).
51 Massachusetts argued that the dairy industry preserves open space, making this an
environmental law. The Court was sarcastic on this point: "As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court recognized by relegating the 'open space' point to a single footnote, the argument that
environmental benefits were central and the enhancement of the market share of Massachusetts dairy
farmers merely 'incidental' turns the pricing order on its head." West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 204
n.20 (citations omitted). Advocacy sometimes requires the strength to give up weaker arguments in
favor of stronger ones. It may be argued that to some lawyers, all facts look the same. One has to
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argument, the Court came back with a strong admonition: "[E]ven if
environmental preservation were the central purpose of the pricing order,
that would not be sufficient to uphold a discriminatory regulation. 5
While dicta, the Court is sending a strong and final message as to where it
sees the importance of the dormant Commerce Clause versus state
environmental protection initiatives.
In the context of the CO 2 cap-and-trade programs, West Lynn's
message is clear: the court is willing to collapse its analysis to measure the
ultimate effect on interstate commerce. The length of the commercial
chain, or which specific link is being regulated, is irrelevant. Further,
whereas Philadelphia and Maine dealt largely with the ability of states to
ban goods from commerce, West Lynn was a case of preferential pricing.
Finally, the Court made it clear, albeit in dicta, that a preferential pricing
program cannot survive, even if it is for a compelling environmental
purpose.
. VI. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN REGULATING LEAKAGE
From the Parts above, the Court, in conducting a Commerce Clause
analysis, will ignore environmental purpose but will instead collapse
regulations to gain the ultimate affect on commerce. Progressing from
most coarse to fine, this Part will review the banning of uncapped power,
economic penalties applied to uncapped power, and finally some other
solutions recently advanced by RGGI in response to leakage concerns.53
A. Direct Banning of Power in the Wholesale Market
State-based prohibition of power delivery within the wholesale market
is an unlikely policy choice and would face substantial challenges long
before one even reaches a dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The
dormant Commerce Clause activates only when the federal government
has not already acted. However, the federal government has reserved the
regulation of the wholesale electricity market for itself. "[U]nder the
Federal Power Act, states have jurisdiction only over retail electric
markets, while FERC [Federal Energy Regulatory Committee] regulates all
wholesale transactions. 54  According to FERC's own website, it
"[r]egulates the transmission and wholesale sales of electricity in interstate
believe that is how a weak argument resulted in a strong condemnation that will continue to haunt the
environmental movement for some years.
"2 West Lynn, 512 U.S. at 204-05 n.20.
53 It bears noting that RGGI is frequently mentioned throughout this Article. This is not due to
any preference and certainly not due to any condemnation of that organization. It is simply a
recognition that the hardworking staff of RGGI are well advanced in their goals and working groups.
The author extends his thanks to the RGGI staff-who sometime years ago gave their time to the
author both as part of a formal program offered jointly through the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies and Yale Law School as well as personally in direct conversation.
5' Ferrey, supra note 34, at 596.
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commerce." 55 Under the title "What FERC Does Not Do" is "[r]egulation
of retail electricity and natural gas sales to consumers. 56
However, even if not pre-empted, it is highly unlikely that a direct ban
would be permissible under Philadelphia. Philadelphia was, itself, a
banning case. This case would be directly analogous. 57 Given the dicta
from the West Lynn decision and the fact that no situation of harmful,
distinguishable goods exists, no regional program has substantially
advanced such a restriction as a viable alternative.
B. Economic Penalties for Leakage
As opposed to a direct ban on importation, the next logical step is to
penalize the purchasers of uncapped power at a level so that they are at
least indifferent to and perhaps discouraged from the purchase of uncapped
power. This economic penalty would appear when a state charges a fee
(either directly or through some cap-based charge) on the retail power
distributors or other purchasers of extra-regional, uncapped power.
Hypothetically, the state governments would institute a charge against the
retail distributor of power for each unit of uncapped power. Alternatively,
in the case of a power generator, they could have purchased power "count"
in the cap applied to power plant--effectively reducing the amount of in-
state power they could produce without purchasing additional certificates.
In any event, purchased power bears an extra economic cost-as it must.
As described in the beginning of this Article, the only meaningful
economic effect a leakage reduction program can have is to make it more
expensive to purchase out-of-state products. The incentive to reduce
emissions through a cap-and-trade program comes when a company can
sell its permits to other power plants. Hence, the cost of reducing GHG
emissions is offset, in whole or part, by the value created in selling the
permits that the repairing company is no longer using. But that implies a
market for these permits. If the new company can buy unregulated power,
then the permits have no value and there is no longer an economic
incentive. The proper economic penalty would approximate the market
price for a permit (or certificate) in the absence of leakage plus the cost of
"5 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, About FERC, What FERC Does,
http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last visited March 31, 2008).
56 Id.
57 Importantly, the Court took a very dim view of an absolute ban or boycott The Court in
Philadelphia stated:
In Bowman and similar cases, the Court held simply that because the articles' worth
in interstate commerce was far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very
movement, States could prohibit their transportation across state lines. Hence, we
reject the state court's suggestion that the banning of "valueless" out-of-state wastes
by ch. 363 implicates no constitutional protection. Just as Congress has power to
regulate the interstate movement of these wastes, States are not free from
constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement.
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622-23.
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monitoring the leakage.
The leakage regulation might have all the appearance of a
constitutionally permissible regulation. Either the charge or the cap
reduction is enacted without regard to origin by simply charging for
uncapped power. The state could justify this through its police power to
safeguard the welfare of its citizens. They might produce evidence to
show that the environmental harm it faces is real. Economists and
climatologists could create models to show the specific damages to the
participating regions and equate them to the costs of the programs. But the
effect of either a cap change or a charge would be to make imported power
more expensive than domestic power. If it does not accomplish this, then
it is not an effective means against a substitute and there is no market.
Many of these arguments echo from Philadelphia. Just as in
Philadelphia, you would have one state or region of states seeking to
"crucial[ly] ... isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting
a barrier against the movement of interstate trade. ' 8 Applied to a CO 2
cap-and-trade program, the common problem is CO 2 emissions growth.
Just as New Jersey was attempting to preserve its natural resource, its
capacity for landfill, so would the cap-and-trade state be trying to preserve
its natural resource, its atmosphere or shoreline. Just as New Jersey made
the argument that the rapid waste growth rate was dangerous to its citizens,
so would the cap-and-trade state argue that the rapid growth in CO 2 will
hurt its citizens' health and finances. However, just as in the Philadelphia
case, these arguments are likely to fail.
Following the Court's Philadelphia logic, there is nothing unique
about the power that is coming into the cap-and-trade state. Power is
power; electrons are electrons. The actual good moving through
commerce is indistinguishable from the good that is being sold. This is
clearly not a case like Maine, where the good itself is harmful.59
Even if the environmental police power argument were accepted by the
Court, the combined leakage charge under a cap-and-trade system would
still be unconstitutional. The portion of the power that was created in-
state, under the state-issued permits, emits CO 2 and is indistinguishable
from the power produced in the extra-regional territories. Power is power;
electrons are electrons. Yet, the imported power engenders a charge. The
in-state, permitted power does not. Since it was made under the cap, the
extra charges do not apply. This gives the in-state producers an economic,
preferential advantage when producing the permitted power.
In this way, the cap-and-trade plus leakage charge combine to look like
58 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628. The entire sentence reads "What is crucial is the attempt by one
State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of
interstate trade." Id. The Court made clear that this distinction is "crucial" and should not be lost on
any Court observer.
'9 Id. at 629.
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a system very similar to West Lynn's tax and subsidy combination-
facially neutral permitting systems combined with evenhandedly applied
leakage systems result in higher import prices. The message from West
Lynn is that the Court will seek to collapse layers of regulations in order to
reach the overall economic effect of the regulation. Once condensed, the
Court would easily see the preference given to the in-region, permitted
producers, while charges are levied for identical power with similar
environmental profiles simply because the others are out of state. One
only has to remember the words of West Lynn---"even if environmental
preservation were the central purpose of the pricing order, that would not
be sufficient to uphold a discriminatory regulation"6°-to realize that a
cap-and-trade program that penalizes the goods of other states as leakage
protection must fail.
Based on the reasoning in both Philadelphia (as explained by Maine)
and West Lynn, there is no credible constitutional argument that allows for
a cap-and-trade program to adequately address leakage through economic
penalty.
C. Specific Proposals from RGGI to Address Leakage and the Dormant
Commerce Clause
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative has addressed leakage in their
paper of March 14, 2007, Potential Emissions Leakage and the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): Evaluating Market Dynamics,
Monitoring Options, and Possible Mitigation Mechanisms. RGGI
provided a detailed analysis of the problem:
Currently, there is insufficient information to make refined
estimates as to the potential amount of emissions leakage that
may occur over the course of the program. Potential
emissions leakage is also sensitive to political developments.
Given current political momentum toward a national
program, Staff views the potential for emissions leakage
primarily as a near- to mid-term concern.6'
However, a follow-up report dated March 2008 demonstrated that
RGGI is clearly concerned about the potential constitutional challenge to
leakage. The group discusses the scenario of penalizing imported power
and discards it without analysis:
In the Initial Report, Staff provided an overview and
assessment of the legal considerations involving
60 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1994).
61 REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI), POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND THE
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI): EVALUATING MARKET DYNAMICS, MONITORING
OPTIONS, AND POSSIBLE MITIGATION MECHANISMS, at ES-2 32 (2007), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/ilreportfinal3_14-07.pdf [hereinafter RGGI, INITIAL REPORT].
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implementation of policy measures to address emissions
leakage. Staff noted, among other things, that states cannot
purposely discriminate against interstate commerce through
the differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter.62
Accepting that premise, RGGI's staff have proposed several leakage
solutions; among them are: 1) Reducing Electricity Demand; 2) Carbon
Adder and Emissions Rate Mechanisms; and 3) Emissions Portfolio
Standards.63
1. Reducing Electricity Demand
Policies and programs that reduce electricity demand can be
expected to reduce the demand for fossil fuel-fired electric
generation, and thus reduces demand for CO2 allowances and
allowance prices. This in turn reduces the generation cost
differential imposed on RGGI-affected generation units
relative to generation units that are not subject to the RGGI
cap, reducing the economic driver of emissions leakage. 64
While reducing electricity demand overall is laudable, it bears noting
that this first recommendation does nothing to help define the market for
trading permits. Instead, it seeks to act on other market drivers in a way to
change the market dynamics that may cause leakage. It truly does not
address trading certificate value or the market mechanisms. It allows
leakage, but simply seeks to reduce its attractiveness.
Advancing this option signals the RGGI's frustration with the leakage
problem. Placed forward as the first recommendation, the demand really
does nothing to solve the market failure for state-based carbon certificates.
The purchase of extra-regional power will destroy the intra-regional
market for GHG-emission certificates whether there is either slight or huge
demand.
2. Carbon Adder and Emissions Rate Mechanisms
Another concept includes devices which do not make power more
62 See RGGI, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE, supra note 24, at 21 (internal citation omitted).
63 See generally id. The RGGI March 2008 report contains an additional option for discussion
called "Capping Emissions Associated with Serving Load." Id. at 7. In sum, this policy placed a total
regional cap for all electricity used within the relevant region. Id. This policy required far more
development to be analyzed in conjunction with a cap-and-trade system. Id. at 7-8. Further, as the
RGGI staff recognized, it represents a policy alternative that is severable from the original emissions
cap-and-trade system: "Due to emissions tracking issues, [RGGI Staff recommend[s] that if a load-
based cap were considered, it should not be implemented in coordination with the RGGI program, but
instead should be operated in parallel with the existing program. Trading[,] at[] least initially, should
not be considered between the two systems." Id. at 37.
"Id. at 17-18.
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expensive through direct charge, but instead which make them appear
more expensive at the time of the buying decision. These devices are
additions to a cost-benefit analysis spreadsheet that are designed to control
the decision of which unit of power to purchase. "A carbon adder
incorporates the price of carbon into the financial analysis of different
generation supply options, and therefore incorporates the C02 emissions
performance of an investment option into the calculus of whether it is
deemed to be the least-cost option."65 This device places a "shadow price"
on uncapped sources.66 When the utility is making its buying decision, it
will discriminate not economically but analytically in order to choose
sources that are lower in carbon.67 This is an attempt to internalize the
perceived negative effects of carbon into the buying decision without the
state charging actual money. Similarly,
[a] carbon procurement emissions rate is a limit that is
placed on the emissions rate of power supplied to [power
distributor] through a long-term power purchase agreement.
This policy would require all long-term power purchases to
meet a specific [pounds of C02 to Megawatt Hour ratio]
emission rate; power could not be supplied through bilateral
contracts with power plants that exceed this emissions rate.68
Both of these methodologies are, by RGGI's own admission, difficult
to implement.69 Since there is a real question as to whether the carbon
adder would have any effect for power purchased on the "spot market,"
both of these devices are really aimed at affecting a power distributor's
ability contracts.70
Unlike the direct economic penalty of the previous section, these plans
place non-economic preferences for low-carbon power emissions but
instead focuses on the administrative decision to purchase power. If the
adders serves as nothing more than a recommendation, then the concept
has little direct effect on the market for tradable permits and garners little
objection. In contrast, if statutorily enacted so that it compels
discrimination against uncapped sources, would the West Lynn analysis
really be any different? While there is no direct economic penalty as in
West Lynn, and no ban like Philadelphia, these approaches, if enforced,
65 RGGI, INITIAL REPORT, supra note 61, at 32.
66id.
67 Id. at 33.
68 d. at 34.
69Id. at 35.
70 See id. at ES-8 ("[The carbon adder] would be of limited utility as a planning tool to evaluate
the carbon intensity of spot market power purchases, as this is a mix of system power including both
low-emitting and high-emitting units, and [Power Distributors] are price takers in the spot market. LSE
purchases of spot market power would not impact the carbon intensity of this power, although LSEs,
when managing their power procurement, would need to account for the carbon intensity of spot-
market power when making a decision to purchase from the spot market.").
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both create an institutional preference for the electrons that come from
within the region. They are "cheaper" in the buying calculation that drives
the decision even if not cheaper in actual payment. Power producers with
higher carbon production are no longer on an equal footing. "[E]ven if
environmental preservation were the central purpose of the pricing order,
that would not be sufficient to uphold a discriminatory regulation.'
3. Emissions Portfolio Standards
Another potential C0 2-mitigation policy is to create resource
portfolios. "A resource portfolio requirement requires certain electricity
sellers and/or buyers to maintain a predetermined percentage of designated
clean resources in their [power] mix. '72 This is required of the retailers,
but there is no in-state or out-of-state preference. While legally attractive,
these are practically difficult.
[U]ncertainty... remain[s] as to the efficacy level of this
mechanism....
One disadvantage is that while the policy would limit
carbon intensity by holding [a power distributor] to a [pounds
of C02 per Megawatt Hour ratio] standard, the electricity
demand within [a power distributor's] service territory could
continue to increase, which could allow for an increase in
absolute emissions of carbon.
Another potential problem is the potential for "attribute
shuffling." An emissions portfolio standard would likely be
implemented using an environmental attribute credit trading
system, which separates the generation attributes from the
electricity commodity. This could be problematic in an open
system that includes both regulated and unregulated regions.
If an [Emissions Portfolio Standard] is not properly designed,
such a compliance mechanism could potentially allow an
[energy supplier] to purchase environmental attributes from
low-emitting generation outside of the RGGI region without
changing its power procurement practices.73
Finally, like the first goal to reduce energy, this solution does not
provide market integrity for the certificates. Instead, it simply provides a
predetermined method where energy suppliers are to adjust their purchases,
making leakage less likely but possible. So-called "green" electricity
could also be purchased from many external sources-filling the portfolio
but damaging the worth of the cap-and-trade certificates.
71 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1994).
72 Ferrey, supra note 34, at 529.
7' RGGI, INITIAL REPORT, supra note 61, at ES- 10.
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VII. CLIMATE LAW MUST BE FEDERAL
There is no substitute for a federal climate law. The dormant
Commerce Clause virtually dooms any regional efforts to create a cap-and-
trade program without leakage. The trading certificates can no longer have
real value as the market substitutes are available. The RGGI staff points
out that "potential for emissions leakage primarily as a near- to mid-term
concern" in light of pending federal regulations.74 Pursuing state or
regionally based cap-and-trade systems has political effectiveness.
A cap-and-trade program that does not address leakage will fail in the
long term. The more successful the program, the greater incentives it
provides to find ways to have uncapped regions produce power. Rather
than limit C0 2, it only highlights what regions will be the most lucrative
for the uncapped power suppliers to target.
Cap-and-trade programs are complex and require both investments in
monitoring and political capital. Should a cap-and-trade program be
enacted, then fail a constitutional challenge, a governor would question the
appropriateness of state-based climate initiatives in total. The remaining,
leaking, cap-and-trade system will be attacked on fairness grounds by
politically active in-state power companies. Once it is clear that only the
regions that own power plants are capped, yet the primary polluters are not
just escaping penalty but are also benefiting, the system should unravel.
Further, legislators would then be reticent to continue to pressure for a
federal system, right at a time when it is most needed. The risks are too
great as a state-based initiative but non-existent as a federal system.
This is no accident that our constitutional jurisprudence all but halts
this regional effort. Our federalist structure exists to have a national
government that solves national problems. Each GHG unit emitted has a
national and global impact. Our history and our structure preserve these
kinds of issues for the federal government. On the issue of Global Climate
Change, the electorate is demanding the creation of a Climate Law despite
a deaf ear from the federal executive and legislative branches. Our system
is designed to put increasing political pressure on these federal legislators
to solve this national problem. That is not to say that regional programs
are without merit. While our laws may prevent their true enactment, their
very creation assists in the political dialogue and, in no small measure, will
serve as one of the bulwarks to move the federal agenda.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the dormant Commerce Clause problem should
encourage policy makers to abandon any long term reliance on regional
74 "Potential emissions leakage is also sensitive to political developments. Given current political
momentum toward a national program, Staff views the potential for emissions leakage primarily as a
near- to mid-term concern." RGGI, INITIAL REPORT, supra note 61, at ES-2.
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cap-and-trade programs in lieu of other solutions and lobbying for a federal
GHG initiative. The regional cap-and-trade programs are not an adequate
substitute for a national policy. They paradoxically provide long-term
economic advantages to the very effects they attempt to cure. Any attempt
to address leakage in conjunction with these programs will run into serious
constitutional challenges. The best use of these programs is for the
political pressure they bring to bear on our federal legislators. In the final
analysis, though, the best efforts of all are aimed toward encouraging the
development of a Federal Climate Law.

